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In the late nineteenth century, European philosophical theologians concerned 
about the perceived threat  of secularity  played a crucial role in the construction of the 
category of “religion,” conceived as a trans-cultural universal, the genus of which the so-
called “world religions” are species. By reading the work of the late John Hick 
(1922-2012), the most influential contemporary philosophical advocate of religious 
pluralism, through an historically informed hermeneutic of suspicion, this paper argues 
that Orientalist-derived understandings of religion continue to play a significant (though 
often unacknowledged) role within philosophy of religion today. Though couched in the 
language of pluralism, Hick’s later work in the philosophy of religion functions 
apologetically to maintain a version of the religious-secular distinction that, while 
theologically  and politically loaded, is, I show, philosophically arbitrary. Moving 
philosophy of religion beyond Eurocentrism, I argue, will require freeing it  from the logic 
of the modern understanding of “religion.”
From the perspective of mainstream analytic philosophy of religion, my approach 
in this paper may seem somewhat unorthodox: employing a broadly genealogical method, 
I begin with a fairly lengthy discussion of the intellectual history of some key concepts in 
contemporary  pluralistic philosophy of religion, including categories like the “world 
religions.” Drawing especially from the work of Charles Taylor and Tomoko Masuzawa, I 
argue that these categories are best understood as part of an emerging self-understanding 
of “the West” as “secular.” It  is within this historical trajectory that I then attempt to 
situation Hick’s “pluralistic hypothesis” that “the great post-axial faiths constitute 
different ways of experiencing, conceiving and living in relation to an ultimate divine 
2Reality  which transcends all our varied visions of it.”1  Rather than engaging Hick’s work 
directly  on its own terms, I read it across the grain, attempting to show how it functions, 
in seeming tension with its stated purpose, to maintain certain Western/Christian 
assumptions. I conclude with a sort of open-ended and admittedly rather schematic 
manifesto for a more genuinely pluralistic approach to the discipline. 
World Religions
To begin, consider the following picture: in the world today  there is a finite 
number of “world religions.” There is some disagreement about which religions qualify 
as world religions – that is to say, “great” or “major traditions” – but as many as 11 are 
typically judged to make the cut.2  Although classified under one of two headings – 
variously  construed as Western vs. Eastern Traditions, Prophetic vs. Wisdom Traditions, 
etc. – each of these major traditions is a token of the same type – namely, religion. 
Religion is a human universal, but it takes many forms, as a result of the differences 
among cultures. The result is a geographical (and quasi-racial) distribution of religion’s 
varying forms, including those characteristic of China, India, the Middle East, and 
Europe. However, although these differences should be respected, perhaps even 
“celebrated,” they are ultimately less significant than the similarities.
Though something of a composite sketch, the foregoing description is, I think, a 
fair characterization of the picture of religion with which most college-educated 
Americans operate.3 It should certainly be familiar to anyone who has taken (or taught) a 
course, or read a textbook, on World Religions. But it is not the mental map with which 
earlier generations of Westerners operated. During the Middle Ages, the Latin term 
1 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1989), 235-6.
2 These include Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, Taoism, Confucianism, 
Shinto, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
 3 Throughout this essay I focus on the U.S., because it is the context I know best; however, I 
suspect that analogous points could be made about other Western understandings.
3religio functioned rather differently – not  as the name of a genus of which Christianity 
was a species, but as a synonym for “piety” or to designate clergy in orders.4  Indeed, as 
David Chidester points out, prior to the Reformation, “the word in English did not have a 
plural.”5 The term “world religion” was similarly first used in the singular, in reference to 
Christianity: non-Christian traditions were at best “national religions,” i.e., non-universal 
religions peculiar to specific geographical regions or people groups.6 Up through the mid-
nineteenth century, as Tomoko Masuzawa notes, Europeans “had a well-established 
convention for categorizing the peoples of the world into four parts, rather unequal in size 
and uneven in specificity, namely, Christians, Jews, Mohammedans (as Muslims were 
commonly called then), and the rest. The last part, the rest, comprised those variously 
known as heathens, pagans, idolaters, or sometimes polytheists.”7  The displacement of 
this earlier taxonomy by the “world religions” schema might be assumed to represent “a 
turn away from the Eurocentric and Eurohegemonic conception of the world, toward a 
more egalitarian and lateral delineation,” but  the historical developments that explain this 
discursive shift require a more nuanced and critical assessment.8  Of particular 
significance, it  seems to me, is the emergence of a new self-understanding of the West as 
secular.
Secularization
Ours is widely  regarded as a secular age, but what exactly does that mean? While 
it is something of a truism that the present differs in important ways from the past, there 
 4 See William Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of 
Modern Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 65.
5 David Chidester, Christianity: A Global History (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 344.
6 Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was 
Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 23.
7 Masuzawa, xi.
8 Masuzawa, 13.
4is today little agreement among scholars of secularization as to precisely what has 
changed, or why. The result  is that different thinkers use the term “secularization” in quite 
different ways. One influential version of secularization theory defines “secularization” 
as the emancipation of once-religious domains of life from ecclesial oversight and the 
resulting structural differentiation of society  into distinct “spheres” – the state, the 
economy, medicine, education – each governed by  its own criteria. A good example of 
this kind of structural differentiation is provided by the separation of church and state in 
liberal democracies. It is in this sense of the term “secular” that  we can speak of the 
United States, France, and India as all being “secular states,” despite varying levels and 
forms of belief and practice. 
According to a second and importantly different account, “secularization” refers 
to a decline in belief and practice – e.g., to people no longer believing in God or attending 
church. As many  scholars have pointed out, there is no necessary connection between 
secularization in the first sense and secularization in the second. Consider the United 
States: “One of the earliest societies to separate Church and State, it is also the Western 
society with the highest statistics for religious belief and practice.”9  Secularization as 
religious decline was widely discussed during the 1960s, but in recent years the theory 
has been subjected to significant criticism, and many of the sociologists and theologians 
who formerly championed the death of God have retracted their obituaries. Peter Berger, 
who once predicted that by “the 21st century, religious believers are likely to be found 
only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture,”10  now 
concedes that “the world today, with some exceptions . . ., is as furiously religious as it 
ever was, and in some places more so than ever.”11  However, the thesis of religious 
9 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2007), 2.
10 Peter Berger, “A Bleak Outlook Is Seen for Religion,” New York Times (25 April 1968), 3. 
Quoted in Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000), 58.
11 Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,” in The 
Descularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, ed. Berger (Washington, D.C.:Ethics 
and Public Policy Center, 1999), 2.
5decline continues to enjoy the support of a number of influential sociologists, and when 
suitably qualified – as a theory about the state of Christian churches in parts of western 
Europe, for instance – it is worthy of serious consideration.
In his recent book A Secular Age, Charles Taylor identifies a third sense of 
“secularization,” which has to do with the conditions for, rather than the extent of, 
belief.12  “The shift to secularity in this sense consists, among other things, of a move 
from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in 
which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to 
embrace.”13 As Steve Bruce has put it, “the position of the modern believer is quite unlike 
that of the Christian of the Middle Ages in that, while we may still believe, we cannot 
avoid the knowledge that many people (including many people like us) believe 
differently.”14  To suggest, in this third sense, that ours is a secular age is to say not that 
belief is declining per se, but that no single perspective – whether “religious” or 
otherwise – enjoys the status of a “default option.” Believers of varying stripes jostle with 
one another, and with “unbelievers”15  – not just in society at large, but within families 
and among friends – and individuals sometimes find themselves conflicted and 
uncertain.16 It is secularization in this third register that Taylor takes as his focus.
 12 The remainder of this section is borrowed from my critical notice of A Secular Age in 
Philosophical Investigations 33:1 (January 2010): 67-74. Permission to reprint is kindly granted by John 
Wiley and Sons.
13 Taylor, 3.
14 Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 18. Bruce is 
developing a point made by Peter Berger in The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of 
Religious Affirmation (London: Collins). 
 15 The scare quotes here are meant to signal that the term “unbelievers” is tendentious: everyone 
believes something.
16 Taylor writes, “This mutual fragilization of all the different views in presence, the undermining 
sense that others think differently, is certainly one of the main features of the world of 2000, in contrast to 
that of 1500.” Taylor, 303-4.
6In order to appreciate what is distinctive about Taylor’s account, it will help to 
contrast it with two other ways of telling the story. According to the first of these, which 
Taylor calls “subtraction theories,” secularity  is what is left  over after human beings have 
managed to liberate themselves from the illusions or epistemic limitations of their 
religious past. One common variant of this view attributes secularization to the rise of 
modern science and the disenchantment of the universe. The history of secularization is 
on this account a story of progress, which can be told only from the perspective of those 
who have already achieved its final enlightened telos.17  As Freud put it in The Future of 
an Illusion, “a turning-away from religion is bound to occur with the fatal inevitability  of 
a process of growth.”18  Against this kind of story, Taylor argues that “Western modernity, 
including its secularity, is the fruit of new inventions, newly constructed self-
understandings and related practices, and can’t be explained in terms of perennial features 
of human life.”19 On Taylor’s view, secularization involves the displacement of one social 
imaginary  by another – or rather, a series of such displacements. However natural and 
unremarkable it may seem to us, secularity had to be constructed.
This latter view – that secularity  was constructed not discovered – is shared by a 
second kind of account with which Taylor’s view can, in certain other respects, also be 
contrasted. This is the view developed by John Milbank and associated with Radical 
17 These supposed developments can of course be given a theological gloss. For example, Hegel 
claimed that “[t]he development and advance of Spirit from the time of the Reformation onwards consist in 
this, that Spirit, having now gained the consciousness of its Freedom, through that process of mediation 
which takes place between man and God – that is, in the full recognition of the objective process as the 
existence of the Divine essence – now takes it up and follows it out in building up the edifice of secular 
relations.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 
1956), 422. More recently, and from a very different philosophical paradigm, Gianni Vattimo has argued 
that, “[i]f it is the mode in which the weakening of Being realizes itself as the kenosis of God, which is the 
kernel of the history of salvation, secularization shall no longer be conceived of as abandonment of religion 
but as the paradoxical realization of Being’s religious vocation.” Gianni Vattimo, After Christiantiy, trans. 
Luca D’Isanto (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 24.
18 Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1961 [1927]), 55.
19 Taylor, 22. Many secularization theorists would agree. For instance, Steve Bruce insists that 
“what people are ‘essentially’ like, stripped of their culture and history, is unknowable, because we are all 
products of culture and history.” Bruce, 42.
7Orthodoxy. On this account, secularization is the outgrowth of an intellectual error, a 
theological mistake. The culprit, on Milbank’s version of the story, is Duns Scotus, whose 
“univocal” conception of being collapsed the difference in kind between God and 
creatures into a difference in degree. From there it was a slippery slope to deism, Hume’s 
Dialogues, and Richard Dawkins. Taylor calls this view the “Intellectual Deviation” 
story. In contrast to subtraction theorists, who associate secularization with progress, 
deviation theorists regard it as decline. Taylor acknowledges that some such theological 
developments may  be part of the story, but he argues that they can’t be the whole – or 
even the most important part  – of it. Milbank’s account is far too intellectualist  to explain 
how secularity “emerges as a mass phenomenon.”20  As a different critic of Radical 
Orthodoxy, Jeffrey Stout, puts the point: “Intellectual errors do sometimes have 
significant social and political consequences, but history rarely works in the theory-
driven way that philosophers and theologians imagine.”21 
It is also clear that Taylor’s tone differs importantly from that of Milbank and 
other theological critics of secularity. Readers of A Secular Age will detect none of the 
nostalgia for the past  or denunciation of the present that characterize much Radical 
Orthodoxy. While there are many features of our times of which Taylor is critical, he 
seems on the whole to think that the trade-offs have worked to our advantage. “Even if 
we had a choice,” he writes, “I’m not sure we wouldn’t be wiser to stick with the present 
dispensation.”22 Contemporary forms of “spirituality” and religious life – though prone to 
distinctive and familiar kinds of corruption – are not  necessarily  as frivolous and self-
indulgent as their detractors like to make out, and in any case there is no possibility  of 
turning back the clock. 
Indeed, if the story Taylor tells is correct, there is something ironic about efforts 
by theologians to reform our wayward age, for on Taylor’s account, it was precisely the 
20 Taylor, 775.
21 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 101.
22 Taylor, 513.
8drive by elites to make better Christians of the masses that helped to produce a secular 
age in the first place: religious Reform, not science or an intellectual error, is the engine 
that drives secularization. As David Martin puts it, “Christians have raised the bar about 
what it  means to be a Christian, and so inhibited the take-up.”23  The Protestant 
Reformation is one example of what Taylor calls “Reform” (with a capital R), but it was 
hardly  an isolated phenomenon. Beginning in the Middle Ages and continuing down 
through the temperance movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Christian 
reformers undertook the challenge of disciplining and re-ordering society, purging it  (as 
best they could) not simply  of perceived vices like the dancing, drinking and sex that 
attended community festivals like Carnival, but also of the “superstitions” and “excesses” 
of popular religion. This process naturally generated resentment toward Christianity’s 
institutional forms and its clergy, which in turn helped to facilitate the emergence in the 
eighteenth century  of what Taylor calls “exclusive humanism”; but it  also gave rise to 
new forms of Christianity characterized by discipline and disenchantment. As Taylor puts 
it, “the interesting story is not simply one of decline, but also of a new placement of the 
sacred or spiritual in relation to individual and social life. This new placement is now the 
occasion for recompositions of spiritual life in new forms, and for new ways of existing 
both in and out of relation to God.”24  Rooted as they were in historical contingencies, 
these developments were far from linear and resulted in very different  outcomes in 
different countries, generations, economic and social classes, professions, political 
systems, etc. 
During what Taylor calls the “expressivist revolutions” of the 1960s, with their 
emphasis on authenticity and self-realization, the pendulum swung back the other 
direction, away from the buffered identities and moral discipline characteristic of Reform, 
breaking the link between Christianity and civilizational order in the West. This has had 
the effect of weakening certain forms of religiosity (those Taylor calls neo-Durkheimian) 
23 David Martin, On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005), 119.
24 Taylor, 437.
9and strengthening others (the post-Durkheimian, in which religion is disconnected from 
national or political identity). The familiar result – dramatized by Robert Wuthnow’s 
distinction between “seeking” and “dwelling”25  – is two distinct sensibilities: “those 
which underlie respectively the new kinds of spiritual quest, on one side, and the prior 
option for an authority which forecloses them on the other.”26 
No doubt most people find themselves somewhere between these ideal types, but 
it also is possible to live one’s life outside what we have come to call “religion.” A recent 
survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that “one-fifth of the U.S. 
public – and a third of adults under 30 – are religiously unaffiliated.”27  Moreover, 
immigration (particularly what Martin calls the “migratory backflow of empire”28), while 
serving to revitalize and “de-Europeanize” American Christianity, is also contributing to 
the diversification of America’s religious landscape.29  “For example, Muslims, roughly 
two-thirds of whom are immigrants, now account for roughly  0.6% of the U.S. adult 
population; and Hindus, more than eight-in-ten of whom are foreign born, now account 
for approximately  0.4% of the population.”30 These percentages may  seem small, but  the 
expansion of America’s traditionally Protestant denominational structure to include first 
Catholics, then Jews, and now Muslims and Hindus is altering how Americans think 
about themselves, and what they believe about each others’ beliefs. According to another 
25 See Robert Wuthnow, After Heaven: Spirituality in America Since the 1950s (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), 3ff.
26 Taylor, 512.
27 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “‘Nones’ on the Rise” (9 October 2012), 9.
28 Martin, 71.
29 See José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), 154ff.
30 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious 
Beliefs and Practices: Diverse and Politically Relevant” (June 2008), 8.
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Pew study, 70 percent of Americans now believe that “many religions can lead to eternal 
life.”31
The net effect of the past five centuries is not, for Taylor, the withering away of 
belief in the West, but a shift in its conditions – of what it  is to believe. The characteristic 
feature of our secular age is what Taylor calls its “immanent frame”: life is lived within a 
self-sufficient, “natural” order, which can be explained and “envisaged without reference 
to God.”32  God is manifest neither in discrete instances of the sacred (as distinct from the 
profane), nor in the moral order on which civilization is said to depend. To say that the 
world can be understood apart  from God is not, however, to say that it  must  be 
understood as closed to transcendence – for the immanent frame can be conceived as 
open to something beyond itself. Indeed, the modern distinction between the natural and 
the supernatural – like the modern conception of a miracle as a violation of a law of 
nature – belongs to the immanent frame, to a world imagined in terms of an order from 
which God’s presence has been withdrawn.33 
Internal Relations
Secularization is typically understood as a theory about what has happened to 
religion in the West under conditions of modernity. Although scholars disagree in terms 
of the answers they  give – differentiation, privatization, decline, etc. – the fact that they 
are capable of debating them suggests that they are agreed as to the nature of the 
question. Of course, much of the disagreement over the state of religion in modernity 
revolves around how “religion” ought to be understood, but the almost universal 
assumption in the literature is that the term can, and indeed must, be defined 
independently of “secularization.” The thesis that secularization involves religious 
31 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey,” 4.
32 Taylor, 543.
33 Whereas the late medieval distinction between the “natural” and the “supernatural” was 
intended by the nominalists and the Protestant Reformers to secure the autonomy of the supernatural 
against the natural, the modern distinction performs the reverse function. Taylor, 542.
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decline, for example, presupposes some independent conception of religion in terms of 
which this putative decline is to be measured. What is often overlooked, however, is that 
historically, the origins of the term “secular” predate the development of our 
contemporary  understanding of religion. Indeed, my suggestion here is that the 
construction of secularity – and perhaps more importantly, the development of various 
teleological discourses of secularization through which these processes were interpreted34 
– is what gave rise to the category  of religion that most scholars today take for granted. 
The hypothesis I’d like for us to entertain is that the key elements of secularization – 
religion, secularity, modernity, and the West – are connected not merely  externally, as 
conventional social-scientific accounts of secularization assume, but internally (or 
conceptually).  
During the middle ages, the secular was contrasted not with religion as we 
understand it today, but with the sacred – a distinction which originally had to do with the 
experience of time. In medieval Latin, the word saeculum meant  “age” or “century.” 
Whereas “we moderns”35  apprehend ourselves to be moving chronologically through 
what Walter Benjamin called “homogeneous, empty time,” medieval Christians, as 
Benedict Anderson has noted, “had no conception of history as an endless chain of cause 
and effect or of radical separations between past and present.”36  The distinction between 
34 These latter discourses may in fact have served to hasten the onset of secularization in Europe. 
Casanova has argued that “[w]e need to entertain seriously the proposition that secularization became a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in Europe once large sectors of the population of western European societies, 
including the Christian churches, accepted the basic premises of the theory of secularization: that 
secularization is a teleological process of modern social change; that the more modern a society, the more 
secular it becomes; and that secularity is ‘a sign of the times.’” José Casanova, “Immigration and the New 
Religious Pluralism,” in Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, ed. Geoffrey Brahm Levey 
and Tariq Modood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 144.
 35 This account of the modern experience of time is an oversimplification, which occludes what 
Homi Bhabha calls “disjunctive temporality” -- the uneasy coming together of varying “times.” See Homi 
K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation” in Homi K. Bhabha, 
ed. Nation and Narration (New York: Routledge, 1990): 291-322. I put the phrase “we moderns” in scare 
quotes as a reminder that the distinction between “us” and “them” is not as clear-cut as might be imagined. 
To put it in Taylor’s idiom, the immanent frame does not include everyone.
36 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Rev. Ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 23. See Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Fontana, 
1973), 263.
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the secular and the sacred marked the difference between ordinary times and kairotic 
times – those moments of history  linked vertically (simultaneously) to eternity, rather 
than horizontally  (sequentially), through the causal relation of one event to the next.37 For 
the medievals, as José Casanova points out, there were in reality three “times,” not two – 
“the eternal age of God and the temporal-historical age, which is itself divided into the 
sacred-spiritual time of salvation, represented by the church’s calendar, and the secular 
age proper (saeculum).”38  What was lost in the transition to modernity was not the 
distinction between history and eternity  – between the respective “times” of this world 
and the next  – but the division within history  between kairoi and chronoi: for “us 
moderns,” all history is experienced as secular time. This collapsing of categories – 
motivated in part by the efforts of “Reformers” to hold all Christians to the same high 
standards, thus breaking down the medieval hierarchy of vocations39 – made it possible to 
use the term “secular” in a new way, as contrasted not with the sacred, but with the entire 
system within which the earlier distinction had its life. The upshot is that religion as we 
tend to think of it today -- a concept that  generalizes outward from the experience of 
European Christians -- was discovered by Europeans just as it seemed to be receding in 
“the West.”40
The emerging discourse of religion was, among other things, a “discourse of 
othering,” which permitted an invidious contrast between the rational, progressive West 
and the religious (and comparatively backward) rest – i.e., those regions of the world 
over against which the imagined community of Europe was in the process of constructing 
a collective identity. For this reason, subtraction theories of secularization played a 
critical role in the development of two new sciences of cultural difference: Orientalism 
37 See the quote by Erich Auerbach in Anderson, 23-4.
 
38 Casanova, Public Religions, 14.
39 See Taylor, 265-6.
40 Masuzawa, 19.
13
and anthropology.41  Whereas the former concerned itself with the “great civilizations of 
the East,” especially their histories and ancient literature, the latter focused on the 
practices of “primitive cultures” – e.g., the “tribal societies” of Africa, the Americas, and 
Oceania – which were understood to have no writing, and so no history. Both categories 
of people were presumed to be more “religious” than Westerners, but the forms of 
religious life differed: great civilizations had “world religions,” whereas tribal societies 
knew only “primitive religion.”42
Pluralism as a Response to Secularization
But the Orientalist  fascination with non-Western cultures that emerged as the 
reverse side of Europe’s new secular self-understanding had unintended consequences. In 
the first place, it seemed to relativize Christianity, cutting it down to size as one 
possibility among others: a world religion rather than the world religion. As Ernst 
Troeltsch put the point in his 1897 essay “Christianity  and the History  of Religion,” 
“Christianity lost its exclusive-supernatural foundation. It  was now perceived as only one 
of the great world religions, along with Islam and Buddhism, and like these, as 
constituting the culmination of complicated historical developments.”43  In addition, the 
development of post-Christian ideologies and the prospect of religious decline threatened 
the Durkheimian link between Christianity and the community from within. In this way, 
the very processes of secularization that allowed subtraction theorists to portray the West 
as an advanced civilization seemed to present a serious challenge to the hegemony of 
Western Christianity.
41 See Masuzawa, 15. The application of traditional secularization theory to regions outside 
Christendom is inherently problematic. As David Martin notes, “in so far as one uses classical 
secularization theory to characterize Islam as undeveloped with respect to internalization, privatization, 
pluralism and democracy, one is using precisely the criteria which derive from Western developments and 
the Gestalt initiated by the Reformation and the Enlightenment. One is also ignoring the huge variety of 
possibilities within contemporary Islam.” Martin, 64.
42 The term is here used in the singular to signal the fact that the “religions” of “primitive cultures” 
were not thought to vary greatly.
43 Ernst Troeltsch, “Christianity and the History of Religion.” Quoted by Masuzawa, 312.
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In response to these anxieties, Troeltsch and other Protestant theologians in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed new ways of thinking and talking 
about religious differences. Their solution, as Masuzawa shows in her book The Invention 
of World Religions, was the pluralistic affirmation of religion as such over against 
secularism, which allowed them to enlist the “world religions” on the side of Christianity, 
rather than viewing them as ideological competitors.44  If “religion” is a human universal, 
then Christianity can be vindicated as a particular (though not unique) instance of the 
more general phenomenon. What began as a discourse of othering was in this way folded 
into a discourse of assimilation.45  Hence, the subtitle of Masuzawa’s book: “How 
European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism.” As she puts it, “the 
new discourse of pluralism and diversity of religions . . . neither displaced nor disabled 
the logic of European hegemony – formerly couched in the language of the universality 
of Christianity – but, in a way, gave it a new lease.”46
The success of this new apologetic strategy  depended on being able to relativize 
the differences among the “religions” and to emphasize their continuities. This meant 
positing an essence to religion behind the variety  – a common thread linking Christianity 
with the other “great  traditions” and enabling us to distinguish religion from irreligion, 
genuine religion from superstition, and the “world religions” from lesser traditions 
(variously  described as “primitive,” “primal,” “tribal,” or “pre-Axial”). In practice, of 
course, identifying an essence was a matter of creation rather than discovery, which 
involved forming other “world religions” in the image and likeness of Christianity. The 
supposedly universal features singled out for comparison – foundational texts (rather than 
44 See Masuzawa, 312ff.
45 Or more precisely: the discourse bifurcated. Today, the secular-religious distinction continues to 
function as part of a politics of exclusion – e.g., toward Muslims in Western countries. Casanova writes, “It 
is the secular identity shared by European elites and ordinary people alike that paradoxically turns religion 
and the barely submerged Christian European identity into a thorny and perplexing issue, when it comes to 
delimiting the external geographic boundaries and to defining the internal cultural identity of a European 
Union in the process of being constituted.” Casanova, “Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism,” 
144.
46 Masuzawa, xiv.
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living practitioners), conceptions of the divine (rather than ritual), etc. – reflected the 
preoccupations of Protestant  theology: anything not exhibiting these markers was by 
definition not a genuine world religion.  
The template was not, however, Christianity in all its messy and disputed 
materiality, but an idealized, secularized Christianity – disenchanted, socially 
differentiated and privatized, disciplined by Reform, and sensitized to the criticisms of its 
cultured despisers. Pluralism was the work of theological elites, and though Protestantism 
supplied the prototype, pluralism improved upon it. This entailed rejecting as inessential 
precisely those dimensions of other traditions that were deemed susceptible to secularist 
critique – that is to say, those features of other religions that Western theologians found 
most embarrassing about their own. As Mark Heim has observed, “It is hardly  an accident 
that pluralistic theology, in its definition and treatment of the religions, takes care to 
inoculate them against just those objections theologians in the West have found so 
troubling.”47  That the “world religions” were constructed so as to correct for perceived 
vulnerabilities in historical Christianity allows them to maintain a delicate balance 
between exoticized otherness and familiar sameness – not unlike so-called “ethnic” 
cuisine adapted to Western tastes. Moreover, since the world religions are seen as 
ultimately  compatible with one another – as different but not incommensurable – their 
various flavors can be sampled without abandoning the comforts of one’s home tradition.
Nevertheless, it  would be inadequate simply to dismiss the “world religions” as 
figments of the Western imagination. Under the weight of European imperialism, life was 
breathed, through a process of appropriation by  non-Westerners, into the projections of 
Western elites. During the nineteenth century, for example, Indian intellectuals fashioned 
a new identity for themselves, drawing freely on Orientalist motifs. “According to their 
projective view, ‘Hinduism,’ though the term itself may be a neologism, refers to the 
ancient faith of India, a religion that was originally and essentially monotheistic, and 
whose ancient wisdom is encapsulated in certain select but voluminous canonical 
47 S. Mark Heim, Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion (Mryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1995), 108.
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texts. . .”48  As Timothy Fitzgerald observes, “[t]he onus was largely  on the local 
representative of the indige[n]ous culture to prove . . . that these forms of life were 
genuine religions, that is soteriologies based on an awareness of God or some equivalent 
transcendental object and advocating moral precepts acceptable to westerners. . .”49  Yet, 
to reject the resulting constructions as inauthentic distortions – as some Western scholars 
appear to do – would be a mistake.50 Against a backdrop of colonial power and European 
prejudice, developments that might at first appear to be mere capitulations to colonialism 
can also be interpreted as forms of resistance by the colonized. As Brian Pennington 
notes, the too simplistic thesis “that Britain invented Hinduism grants altogether too 
much power to colonialism: it  both mystifies and magnifies colonial means of domination 
and erases Hindu agency and creativity.”51  By living into the constructions of Westerners, 
but also subverting and exploiting them in subtle ways, Indian elites like Swami 
Vivekananda, who introduced Vedanta to Americans at the first World’s Parliament of 
Religions, were able to claim for Hinduism – once categorized under the rubric of 
“paganism” – the privileges reserved by the West for world religions.52 
That the pluralist paradigm had acquired a life of its own was evident when the 
Parliament convened in Chicago in 1893. On September 11 of that year, according to 
48 Masuzawa, 283.
49 Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 31.
 50 It would also, ironically, reinscribe the claim by Western scholars to understand non-Western 
traditions better than do their practitioners.
51 Brian Pennington, Was Hinduism Invented? Britons, Indians, and the Colonial Construction of 
Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5. Today, many millions of people self-identify as 
“Hindu”; to write contemporary Hinduism off as inauthentic only adds insult to injury by ironically 
perpetuating the Orientalist claim to know the tradition better than its practitioners. Of course, one need not 
uncritically accept the claims of Hindutva – e.g., that Hinduism is the oldest world religion.
52 Referring to Vivekananda’s enthusiastic reception at the Parliament, Diana Eck writes, “Perhaps 
America’s own burgeoning universalist spirit was eager to hear that spirit echoed by a young Hindu 
reformer from the other side of the world.” Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a “Christian 
Country” Has Become the World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 97. 
My own view is slightly more skeptical.
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Richard Hughes Seager, “the Columbian Liberty Bell in the Court of Honor of the 
World’s Columbian Exposition tolled ten times to honor what were a century ago 
considered the world’s ten great religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism, 
Taoism, Confucianism, Shintoism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.”53  More than sixty 
religious leaders, representing the “great traditions,” assembled to greet what Seager calls 
“the dawn of religious pluralism.” The purpose of the parliament, as Charles Carroll 
Bonney reminded the delegates in his opening address, was “to unite all Religion against 
all irreligion; to make the golden rule the basis of this union; and to present to the world 
the substantial unity of many religions in the good deeds of the religious life.”54  Here we 
can witness in their infancy rhetorical moves that anticipate those of many contemporary 
interfaith movements: the invocation of “Religion” – here capitalized – against 
secularism; the bringing together of elites to “represent” religion’s major taxa; the quest 
for a global “religious ethic”; and the harnessing of religion’s moral energies to the cause 
of global progress.
It is notable that the World’s Parliament of Religions was held in conjunction with 
the World’s Columbian Exposition – the nation’s celebration of the four hundredth 
anniversary of Columbus’s arrival in the Americas. For the development of the pluralistic 
paradigm can be understood as both an outgrowth of, and as colluding in, Western 
expansionism. As we saw earlier, a secular age is characterized, on Taylor’s account, not 
by the absence of belief but by a diversity of “options.” However, one weakness of 
Taylor’s analysis, in my view, is that it pays inadequate attention to the ways in which 
colonialism and neo-colonialism (in the guise of neo-liberal globalization) have 
53 Richard Hughes Seager, Introduction to Part I, The Dawn of Religious Pluralism: Voices from 
the World’s Parliament of Religions, 1893, ed. Seager (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1993), 15. Note that 
Sikhism had not yet made the list.
54 Charles Carroll Bonney, “Words of Welcome,” in The Dawn of Religious Pluralism, 21.
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contributed to this proliferation of possibilities.55 These colonial encounters had the effect 
not simply of bringing new religious possibilities to European awareness but  also of 
commodifying these possibilities as consumer items for Western markets. So conceived – 
as “‘brands’ of a common product” – the world religions pose little threat to regnant 
political and economic orders.56  As Masuzawa notes, “One of the most consequential 
effects of this discourse is that  it spiritualizes what are material practices and turns them 
into expressions of something timeless and suprahistorical, which is to say, it 
depoliticizes them.”57 
This process of privatization, commodification, and assimilation has 
fundamentally altered the relationship  of Christianity  to other traditions. The distinctive 
feature of the so-called world religions is that they  are options within, rather than 
alternatives to, Western culture. By contrast, pluralist Christianity  is not always a 
possibility within other cultural horizons: witness the typically unrequited appropriation 
by Westerners of Kabbalah, Sufism, yoga, Zen meditation, Feng Sui, the Dalai Lama, etc. 
The effect of this asymmetry is a kind of missionary  project in reverse: instead of 
attempting to impose itself on alien cultures, pluralistic Christian theology draws these 
cultures – or suitably  repackaged versions of them – into its own orbit. While permitting 
the validation of other perspectives, it  nevertheless retains its ideological hegemony by 
supplying the framework within which these perspectives are organized and evaluated. If 
the world religions are consumer products, pluralism controls the means of production. 
Today, Western fantasies of non-Western religious authenticity intersect with non-
Western adaptive strategies in curious ways: while Western practitioners of Zen 
55 As Charles Long has observed, the changes wrought within the cultures of colonizers as a result 
of contact with colonized peoples are frequently downplayed, because the “signifiers” – his term for those 
in positions of rhetorical privilege – tend to “explain all changes as modes of development and evolution of 
ideational and historical clusters of meaning” already latent within the signifiers’ own cultures “that have 
come to fruition in the modern period.” Charles H. Long, Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the 
Interpretation of Religion (Aurora, Co.: The Davies Group, 1986), 6.
56 Heim, 110.
57 Masuzawa, 20.
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Buddhism meditate on tatami mats, many  Japanese-Americans sit on pews and sing 
hymns in Buddhist “churches.”
Understandably, this emerging conception of religion bore within its optimistic 
shell the seeds of future resentment. The same pressures that forged the world religions 
also helped to galvanize those distinctly modern social movements which – again 
extrapolating from Christianity – we call “fundamentalisms.” If mimesis and adaptation 
represent one path to empowerment for non-Western religious movements, nativism and 
resistance represent another: only the moral valences are switched. It is precisely those 
ostensibly  religious dimensions of culture that defy  Western appropriation – so-called 
traditional women’s roles, for instance – that nativists seize upon as most “authentic.” 
Given the benign constructions they have imposed on the data, pluralists have been 
particularly ill prepared to understand these developments, which they  tend to attribute to 
religion’s having been “hijacked” by political forces external to itself, little realizing that 
religion and politics cannot so neatly be disintricated.
Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis
 It is within the trajectory  marked out in the preceding pages that I would like to 
locate John Hick’s magnum opus, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the 
Transcendent, which developed out  of the Gifford lectures he gave in 1986-7. In the well-
known book, Hick advances what he calls “the pluralistic hypothesis” – i.e., the claim 
that “the great post-axial faiths constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiving and 
living in relation to an ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied visions of 
it.”58  Hick calls this divine reality “the Real.” Drawing a quasi-Kantian distinction 
between things as they are in themselves and those same things as we experience them, 
he argues that although the Real an sich is ineffable, it  can variously be represented as a 
personal deity or an impersonal absolute, depending on the culture. For instance, God 
(though conceived as ultimate within Christianity) and Brahman (though conceived as 
58 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1989), 235-6.
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ultimate within certain forms of Hinduism) are simply “different manifestations of the 
truly Ultimate within different streams of human thought-and-experience.”59  For Hick, 
“the divine noumenon is a necessary postulate of the pluralistic religious life of 
humanity.”
How does Hick arrive at this conclusion? What problem is it meant to solve? Hick 
begins his argument with the observation that we live in a “religiously ambiguous” world, 
one which “evokes and sustains non-religious as well as religious responses.”60 In face of 
this ambiguity, the religious believer (no less than the religious skeptic) is entitled to trust 
her or his own experience:
[I]n the absence of any positive reason to distrust one’s experience – and 
the mere fact that in this religiously ambiguous universe a different, 
naturalistic, epistemic practice is also possible does not constitute such a 
reason – it is rational, sane, reasonable for those whose religious 
experience strongly leads them to do so to believe wholeheartedly  in the 
reality of God.”61
But here, Hick suggests, a difficulty arises: the very same argument he has been using to 
show that Christians can be justified on the basis of their experiences in believing in God 
can be deployed to show that other people with different experiences can be justified in 
believing in things that seem to be incompatible with God. “Thus,”  he writes, “those who 
report the advaitic experience of oneness with Brahman, or who experience in the ego-
less state of Nirvana the reality of the eternal Buddha-nature, or who are conscious of the 
‘emptiness’ of all things as their fullness of ‘wondrous being,’ are entitled to base their 
belief-systems on those forms of experience.” 62 It will not do, Hick maintains, to “claim 
59 Hick, 249, italics added.
60 Hick, 74.
61 Hick, 221.
62 Hick, 228.
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that our own form of experience, together with that of the tradition of which we are a 
part, is veridical whilst the others are not,”  since this would amount to a violation of “the 
intellectual Golden Rule of granting to others a premise on which we rely ourselves.” 63 It 
is at this point that Hick introduces the pluralistic hypothesis as the only satisfying way of 
accounting (“religiously”) for the varieties of religious experience: his conclusion is that 
the incompatibilities among the various religions are merely apparent, and that each 
tradition is in fact oriented around the same noumenal religious object, variously 
encountered in the phenomenal world.
	
 I rehearse these arguments not because I find them compelling – I don’t – but 
because they nicely illustrate the pluralistic apologetic I have been describing. The first 
thing to notice about them is that they frame the path to religious commitment as in effect 
involving two choices – the first between religion and naturalism and the second among 
the “great religions.”  These options can be conceived on the model of a decision tree: it is 
only when one has opted against naturalism that one is confronted with the plurality of 
religions. On this construal, the choice between religion and irreligion is logically prior to 
the choice among the religions and requires “a cognitive decision in face of an 
intrinsically ambiguous universe.”64 The term Hick uses to describe the “choice”  to 
experience the world religiously is “faith.”  He writes, “[T]his fundamental option occurs 
at the deeper level of the cognitive choice whereby we come to experience in either a 
religious or a non-religious way.” 65 
The second observation to make is that Hick’s argument against religious 
exclusivism – i.e., the view that “our own form of religious experience, together with that 
of the tradition of which we are a part, is veridical whilst the others are not” 66 – begs a 
rather important question. This becomes apparent if we ask why the kind of grounds on 
63 Hick, 235.
64 Hick, 159.
65 Hick, 159.
66 Hick, 235.
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which the person of faith is entitled to reject naturalism do not also permit, e.g., the 
Christian to reject Buddhism, or vice versa. Recall that when defending the rationality of 
faith, Hick had argued that “the mere fact that in this religiously  ambiguous universe a 
different, naturalistic, epistemic practice is also possible” does not constitute a reason to 
distrust one’s religious experience, and that in the absence of compelling reasons for 
doubt, it is “rational, sane, reasonable for those whose religious experience strongly leads 
them to do so to believe wholeheartedly in the reality of God.”67  But if naturalistic 
responses to the world do not give the religious believer reason to doubt, why should the 
existence of alternative religious responses constitute an objection to religious 
exclusivism?68  If, for example, a Christian has had experiences that lead her to believe in 
God, but not experiences that lead her to believe in Nirvana, and if it seems to her (on the 
basis of her total experience) that belief in God is incompatible with belief in Nirvana, 
then why is she not entitled to believe that experiences of Nirvana must  not be veridical? 
It would seem that the exclusivist would be entitled to reject the veridicality of alternative 
religious experiences and the truth of alternative religious beliefs on precisely the same 
kind of grounds that  Hick says entitle us to reject beliefs about “witchcraft, astrology, or 
alchemy, or the existence of extra-galactic intelligences controlling our minds through 
rays, or the demonic causation of disease” – namely, that they fail “to cohere with what 
we believe on the basis of our experience as a whole.”69 Hick’s verdict with respect to the 
latter beliefs would appear to apply  in the religious case as well: that “although we may 
recognize that people of other cultures have reasonably  held these beliefs, nevertheless 
we shall not feel obliged to hold them ourselves; indeed we may on the contrary feel 
obliged to reject them.”70  Hick’s argument in favor of religious pluralism seems to 
67 Hick, 221.
68 The question here is not the sociological/psychological question explored by Berger and others 
of whether plurality weakens religious confidence and vitality.
69 Hick, 219.
70 Hick, 219.
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depend on the premise that belief in God does not actually  contradict belief in Nirvana. 
But since that is precisely the conclusion he is attempting to prove, to assume it from the 
outset is to beg the entire question against the exclusivist.
My aim here is not to defend exclusivism, but to point up  an inconsistency in 
Hick’s argument for the pluralistic hypothesis – one required by the two-story structure I 
described a moment ago. This two-stage presentation – sometimes construed in terms of a 
distinction between faith and belief71  – is central to the pluralist polemic against 
secularism. Its rhetorical effect is to simplify what is otherwise rather messy by insisting 
that there is only one kind of difference that matters – that between religion and its 
antithesis – rather than many. Unlike in the case of the various religions, each of which 
represents a valid and salvific interpretation of the Real, the issue between faith and 
naturalism is “ultimately a factual one in which the rival worldviews are subject to 
eventual experiential confirmation or disconfirmation.” 72 But once one acknowledges the 
inconsistency of treating the “choice”  (to use Hick’s term) against, say, Buddhism 
differently than the “choice”  against naturalism, the second story of Hick’s edifice 
collapses into the first, and one is faced with a “choice”  not simply between religion and 
naturalism, or among the “great religions,”  but among all of these (and a variety of other) 
possibilities, with the notable exception of “religion”  conceived generally. In other words, 
without the two-stage structure, religion cannot be treated as a single (if internally 
differentiated) option contrastable with naturalism.
Over the past two decades, Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis has been criticized not 
only by “exclusivists”  like Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen, who argue that it 
assumes more than Hick’s arguments warrant, but also by theologians like John Cobb and 
Mark Heim, who contend that it is does not go far enough: insofar as it presupposes a 
single religious object and a single conception of salvation, the “pluralistic hypothesis” 
seems curiously un-pluralistic. On Hick’s account, the “world religions”  are finally to be 
71 See, e.g., Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Faith and Belief (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979).
72 Hick, 13.
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celebrated not because of their differences, but in spite of them. My claim is that this is 
not simply an oversight; rather, it is motivated by the underlying logic of the pluralistic 
defense against irreligion. Here, then, we can begin to see how Hick’s ostensible 
pluralism is in fact encouraged by distinctively  Christian concerns about secularization in 
the West. It is at bottom an apologetic project, as Hick readily admits,73  and the 
challenges to which it responds are distinctively Western in origin. That this is so can be 
clarified further by taking another look at Hick’s discussion of the world’s “religious 
ambiguity.”74 
Careful examination reveals that Hick’s use of the concept of ambiguity is itself 
rather ambiguous. On the one hand, he suggests that the universe “is religiously 
ambiguous in that it  is capable of being interpreted intellectually and experientially in 
both religious and naturalistic ways.”75  This way  of putting the point implies that some 
people experience it  one way, and others experience it the other way: some believe in 
God, for instance, and some don’t. This much is uncontroversial. But Hick proceeds in 
the same paragraph to remark that “ideally, the religious person should, even whilst 
experiencing and living in the world religiously, be able to acknowledge its theoretically 
equivocal character; and the same holds vice versa for the non-religious person.”76  On 
73 See Hick, 9. The social location from and for which Hick writes can further be clarified by 
interrogating the way he uses the first-person plural pronoun at crucial junctures, as for example when he 
writes, in a quotation cited a moment ago, that belief in witchcraft and the demonic causation of disease 
“fails to cohere with what we believe on the basis of our experience as a whole”: who is this “we,” anyway? 
Plainly, it does not include many of the world’s current inhabitants, including a good many Americans, who 
seem to detect no such incoherence.
74 In earlier writings, Hick had appealed to religious ambiguity in the context of theodicy. In these 
works, the world’s religious ambiguity is a function of the “epistemic distance” required for human 
freedom: an ambiguous world is precisely the kind a God would want to create in order to ensure that 
humans have the possibility of freely responding. Hick’s later work appears to take over this earlier 
conception of the world as religiously ambiguous but to situate it in the context of a rather different 
epistemology. Here “religious ambiguity is a special case of the general fact that our environment is 
capable of being construed – in sense perception as well as ethically and religiously – in a range of ways.” 
Hick, 12.
75 Hick, 129.
76 Hick, 129.
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this interpretation, it  isn’t simply that some see the world one way  and others the other 
way, but that everyone should be able to see it both ways. It  seems plain, however, that 
many people do not see it both ways. In fact, Hick admits this. For instance, he notes that 
for pre-modern people, “the reality of the transcendent was accepted as manifest fact, 
unquestioned except by  an occasional boldly skeptical philosopher.”77  He also 
acknowledges that in the contemporary world “the skeptics have mostly  been secularized 
Christians and Jews or post-Christian and post-Jewish Marxists,” and that “[d]istinctively 
post-Hindu, post-Buddhist and post-Muslim forms of skepticism have yet  to arise.”78 
Indeed, it is worth noting in this connection that the world isn’t  particularly religiously 
ambiguous to the skeptics themselves: Sam Harris and Richard Dawkins are no less 
confident in their views than were the premoderns. 
So for whom is the universe religiously ambiguous? Hick’s answer seems to be 
that it is experienced in this way  primarily by modern Christians and Jews in the West. 
Indeed, the chapters dealing with the world’s ostensibly “seamless cloak of religious 
ambiguity” focus entirely on arguments for and against the existence of God, as these 
have arisen in Western philosophy.79  In other words, a distinctively modern problem in 
the West – the question of God’s reality – is here being universalized into a general thesis 
about the universe itself: that it is not universally experienced as ambiguous only goes to 
show that not everyone has (yet) grasped its true nature. 
I don’t deny  that the world can be experienced as ambiguous; I experience it that 
way myself. But ambiguity is in the eye of the beholder. To put the point in Taylor’s 
terms, the world is experienced as religiously ambiguous by those within the immanent 
frame, for whom the frame remains at least  slightly open. Those outside the immanent 
frame – such as premodern Westerners or perhaps some in non-Westernized cultures – or 
for whom the frame is closed to all forms of transcendence – such as Dawkins – do not 
77 Hick, 73.
78 Hick, 74.
79 Hick, 114.
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seem to experience the world in this way. To insist, as Hick does, that  the latter have 
failed to grasp a general truth – as though the world’s religious ambiguity were analogous 
to the earth’s sphericity – is simply  to project ahistorically one’s own epistemic situation 
onto others. 
Challenges for Philosophy of Religion: A Mini-Manifesto
I wish that I could draw from the preceding remarks a tidy conclusion but must 
confess to having more questions than answers. What I shall attempt to offer instead are 
three inter-related challenges for those of us who, while suspicious of the ideology of 
“world religions,” remain interested in something resembling pluralistic philosophy of 
religion.
The first is to engage other points of view without colonizing them. The cultural 
and religious landscape in which most  of us live and work is changing in ways that 
philosophers of religion can ill afford to ignore. Not only is it  becoming more diverse, but 
attitudes toward diversity are changing. For some, this means that the repertoire of 
available “options” is expanding, but I think it would be a mistake to generalize this 
observation. As I have tried to indicate, the relation of pluralist Christianity to other 
perspectives is often asymmetrical. These differences are especially salient in the case of 
immigrant and minority communities struggling to maintain collective identities in face 
of powerful mechanisms for assimilation. From this perspective, the suggestion that  “all 
religions” are equally  valid – with its implication that differences of belief and practice 
are of no real importance – is likely  to be perceived as a threat  to the distinctiveness and 
integrity  of their own communities. Without careful attention to the dynamics by  which 
“religious” identities are constructed and differences assimilated, otherwise well-meaning 
pluralists risk becoming gatekeepers for American denominationalism, custodians of civil 
religion.80  Engagement with integrity  will require greater sensitivity to imbalances of 
80 Though disestablished and contested on virtually every side, liberal Protestantism retains 
considerable privilege in American public life, which means that, in seeking to affirm the validity of other 
religions, traditionally Protestant schools of theology run a similar risk of taking on the role of accrediting 
agencies for non-Christian traditions.
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power and access in what passes for “inter-religious dialogue,” as well as to the various 
“vertical” registers of power that the “flat,” lateral delineation of “world religions” 
obscures.81
Nor can we assume that  such dialogue will take place within a shared context of 
secularity. Taylor has argued that  “the immanent frame is common to all of us in the 
modern West,” but on this point I think he is mistaken.82  For reasons I have alluded to 
already – including colonialism, economic globalization, and global migration – the 
“modern West” is not the end product of an autonomous tradition but the site of 
confluence of many streams of cultural transmission. The diversity  characteristic of any 
major American or European city is a result  not simply of internal fragmentation within 
Western culture but  also of the West’s contact with non-Western cultures through both 
inward migration and outward expansion. If “the West” is taken to denote, among other 
things, a quasi-geographical space, however porous and elastic its borders, then the 
diversity that characterizes it today surely  includes a good many outside the immanent 
frame. Immanence may be typical of one kind of modernity, but there are multiple 
modernities.
One reason other forms of life tend to escape our notice is precisely  because the 
discourse of world religions conceals them. Pluralism is defined as much by what it 
excludes as by what it includes. Indeed, the “major traditions” affirmed by contemporary 
pluralism are nearly identical to those investigated by nineteenth-century Orientalism, 
from which, after all, pluralism inherited its typology. The language of “major” or “great” 
traditions should alert us to the presence of hierarchies of power and status even within 
the pluralist paradigm. As J.Z. Smith has noted, “A World Religion is a religion like ours; 
but it is, above all, a tradition which has achieved sufficient power and numbers to enter 
our history, either to form it, interact with it, or thwart  it. All other religions are 
 81 I have in mind here class, race, gender, sexuality, etc.
82 Taylor, 543.
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invisible.”83  In a similar vein, Charles Long observes, “More often than not, the 
differences that  bring a culture or a people to the attention of the investigator are not 
simply  formed from the point of view of the intellectual problematic; they are more often 
than not  the nuances and latencies of that power which is part of the structure of the 
cultural contact itself manifesting itself as intellectual curiosity.”84
Moreover, even among those perspectives the existence of which pluralism 
acknowledges, there are two that  lie beyond the limits of its otherwise capacious 
embrace. On one side is secularism – for it is this over against which “religion” is defined 
and defended – and on the other are those “exclusivist” forms of Christianity  that 
pluralism claims to supersede. That even pluralism requires exclusions serves to remind 
us that there is no view of culture from above, no perspective on diversity that does not 
contribute to it. 
A second challenge for philosophers of religion is thus to respect conceptual 
differences without pretending to be neutral. Some scholars of religion attempt to 
“bracket” questions of value in the interests of morally and theologically  disinterested 
description. But whatever its merits in the social sciences – and these are debated by 
social scientists themselves – the epoché clearly  won’t  do in normative disciplines like 
philosophy, theology, and ethics. To bracket evaluative questions would be to set  aside 
the very subjects and methods that define these disciplines. 
If we are honest, we will admit that diversity can be celebrated only  within limits. 
This is not merely a moral or political point but a logical one: real cultural and religious 
diversity involves incompatibility, and respect for conceptual differences precludes 
assigning equal value to everything. Like a jigsaw puzzle that has had some extra pieces 
mixed in, there are more possibilities on the table than will fit neatly  into a single frame 
or form a coherent picture. As Raimundo Panikkar has repeatedly stressed, “[a] pluralistic 
83 Jonathan Z. Smith, Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions (Chicago: 
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system would be a contradiction in terms.”85  There is more in heaven and on earth than 
can be contained in any  philosophy: if it  could all be reconciled and systematized, there 
would be no differences left to celebrate. 
Here we encounter a third challenge, namely, to allow our self-understandings to 
be tested by  what they exclude. All evaluation is perspectival, but  perspectives can be 
enlarged. The recognition that diversity can be celebrated only within limits need not 
issue in exclusivism or narrow-minded self-satisfaction. Indeed, it is only when the other 
is allowed to be itself that it  can challenge the (sometimes politicized) limits of our 
present thinking. Instead of constructing a “respectable” other, we must allow the other to 
test our criteria of respectability: domesticated differences neither present any serious 
threat nor provide any opportunity for growth. 
The encounter with otherness is often painful, and “celebration” is not always the 
right word to describe what transpires: incompatibility, after all, is the stuff of tragedy. 
Sorrow and repentance are often in order. Yet, I remain convinced that serious 
engagement, undertaken soberly and alert  to the subtle relationship of knowledge to 
power, is well worth the effort. In any case, the choice is not whether to engage, but how: 
in today’s globalized world, engagement can be done well or badly, but  it can’t  be 
avoided.
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